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THE LIMITS OF LEGAL LANGUAGE: 
DECISIONMAKING IN CAPITAL CASES 
Jordan M. Steiker* 
INTRODUCTION 
Few areas of constitutional adjudication have generated as much 
doctrinal complexity in so little time as contemporary death penalty law. 
Thirty years ago, federal constitutional rulings placed virtually no re-
straints on state death penalty practices apart from generic rulings that 
applied to all state criminal proceedings.1 At that time, the Supreme 
Court had less to tell states about capital punishment than it routinely 
told them about much more mundane matters of state civil and criminal 
law. The Court had, for example, spoken much more clearly and di-
rectly to state efforts to terminate driver's licenses than to state efforts 
to impose the ultimate punishment.2 Nor did Court intervention seem 
particularly likely. As late as 1962, Alexander Bickel lamented that the 
Court had "missed or·ha[d] willfully passed up its most signal opportu-
nities" to address the constitutionality of capital punishment and that 
"barring spectacular extraneous events, the moment of judgment" re-
garding the death penalty was "a generation or more away. "3 
* Cooper K. Ragin Regents Professor, University of Texas School of Law. B.A. 
1984, Wesleyan; J.D. 1988, Harvard. - Ed. My thanks to Carol Steiker for her helpful 
comments and suggestions. A version of this paper was delivered as a Clason lecture at 
the Western College of Law in April, 1996. 
1. See, for example, Hugo Bedau's observation, as late as 1968, that "not a single 
death penalty statute, not a single statutorily imposed mode of execution, not a single 
attempted execution has ever been held by any court to be 'cruel and unusual punish-
ment' under any state or federal constitution." Hugo Adam Bedau, The Courts, the 
Constitution, and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 201, 228-29. 
2. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (holding that Georgia's statutory 
scheme for suspending driver's licenses was constitutionally infirm insofar as it denied 
the petitioner a hearing on the question whether there was a reasonable possibility of a 
judgment being rendered against him as a result of his involvement in an accident). 
3. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLmcs 242 (1962). The "missed opportunities," in Bickel's 
view, included the Court's decision upholding Louisiana's effort to electrocute a con-
demned man whom the state previously had attempted to electrocute without success, 
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); its decisions permitting the 
executions of inmates of questionable sanity without adequate procedural safeguards for 
determining sanity, Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958), and Solesbee v. 
Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950); its "acquiescence" in the proceedings that led to the exe-
2590 
August 1996] Capital Decisionmaking 2591 
Bickel's prediction, of course, was way off the mark. Within ten 
years of his assessment, opponents of capital punishment, buoyed by 
the "revolution" in criminal procedure advanced by the Warren Court, 
had successfully drawn the Court into the constitutional fray. The 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund led the effort to halt executions through a 
"moratorium" strategy by raising a myriad of procedural and substan-
tive challenges to state death penalty schemes in cases in which "real" 
execution dates loomed.4 After their much heralded success in limiting 
the practice of death-qualifying jurors in capital cases,5 the abolitionist 
and reformist forces appeared to lose decisively when the Court upheld, 
against due process challenge, "standardless discretion" in capital sen-
tencing in McGautha v. California.6 Indeed, immediately after Mc-
Gautha was announced, Justice Brennan had become convinced "that it 
was not just a lost skirmish, but rather the end of any hope that the 
Court would hold capital punishment to be unconstitutional. " 7 He ac-
cordingly recommended that the Court decline review in all of the nu-
merous death cases that had worked their way through the lower courts 
and been held pending the Court's resolution of McGautha and other 
potentially far-reaching capital cases.8 
Political machinations on the Court, however, led to the grant of 
certiorari in "clean cases" challenging the constitutionality of capital 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.9 Both the arguments of the 
litigants and the ensuing opinions of the fractured Court reveal that 
cution of the Rosenbergs, which Bickel likened to the French reign of terror, Rosenberg 
v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953); and the Court's refusal to intervene in the Chess-
man case, despite Bickel's view that at the time of his execution, Chessman's crime was 
arguably no longer capital, Chessman v. Teets, 362 U.S. 966 (1960), Chessman v. Dick-
son, 361 U.S. 955 (1960), and Chessman v. California, 361 U.S. 871 (1959). 
4. See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND CAPITAL PuN!SHMENT (1973) (describing the abolitionist efforts of the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund in the years preceding Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). 
5. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (invalidating a death sentence ob-
tained after the state was permitted to strike for cause all jurors who had conscientious 
objections to capital punishment). 
6. 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
7. William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A 
View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313, 321 (1986). 
8. Id. at 321-22. Adding to Bickel's list of "missed opportunities" were the 
Court's decisions in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970), which raised the Mc-
Gautha issue of standardless discretion but which the Court ultimately decided on much 
narrower Witherspoon grounds, and, more significantly, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238 (1969), which challenged the death penalty as "cruel and unusual" when imposed 
for the crime of robbery but which the Court disposed of based on the inadequacy of 
the petitioner's guilty plea. 
9. Brennan, supra note 7, at 322. 
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Furman v. Georgia10 was not a piecemeal evaluation of particular as-
pects of state death penalty practices but rather an encompassing assess-
ment of the moral, political, and practical dimensions of the American 
system of capital punishment. 
The five Justices who voted to strike down all of the capital stat-
utes before the Court11 - and by implication, nearly all of the capital 
statutes then in force 12 - wrote separate opinions identifying various 
and, to some extent, conflicting rationales for the Court's judgment. 
Notwithstanding their separate writings, the "majority" Justices did 
share several fundamental criticisms of the status quo that revolved 
around an acknowledged fact: despite the broad death eligibility estab-
lished in most state schemes, relatively few persons were sentenced to 
death and fewer still were executed in the decade before Furman. 13 The 
rarity of death sentences and executions suggested that at least some of 
those responsible for administering capital punishment - prosecutors, 
judges, juries, and executive officials - lacked the will to impose a 
widely available punishment. This gap led Justice Brennan to conclude 
that the death penalty no longer enjoyed genuine support in the commu-
nity and that its continued availability as a penalty was contrary to 
"evolving standards of decency." 14 The paucity of executions in rela-
tion to broad death eligibility was troubling to other members of the 
Court because there was simply no reliable evidence indicating that 
those executed or sentenced to death were in any sense the most deserv-
ing of death among the death eligible.15 Worse still, some members of 
10. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
11. In addition to deciding Furman, the Court reviewed three other cases: Jackson 
v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas, and Aikens v. California. See 403 U.S. 952 (1971) (grant-
ing certiorari). 
12. Of the 40 state statutes in effect at the time of Furman, all but Rhode Island's 
suffered from the defect of "standardless" discretion and were thus unenforceable in 
light of the decision. Rhode Island's mandatory death penalty provisions were effec-
tively struck down later when the Court held that the Eighth Amendment requires "in-
dividualized" sentencing in capital cases. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 282-305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (invalidating nondiscretionary death penalty 
statute). 
13. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The outstand-
ing characteristic of our present practice of punishing criminals by death is the infre-
quency with which we resort to it."); 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); 408 
U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring). 
14. See 408 U.S. at 269 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)); cf. 408 U.S. 
at 362-64 (Marshall, J., concurring) (maintaining that fully informed citizens would 
conclude that the death penalty is barbarously cruel). 
15. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("These death sentences are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unu-
sual."); 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he death penalty is exacted with 
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the Court, particularly Justice Douglas, feared that the few individuals 
caught in the death penalty web were selected for discriminatory, mor-
ally irrelevant reasons, such as race or class. 16 
These shared concerns about the alarming chasm between the 
death penalty in theory and the death penalty in fact naturally led the 
Court to condemn the absence of legislative guidance in state schemes. 
Notwithstanding Justice Harlan's eloquent rejection of the petitioner's 
claim in McGautha that the death penalty decision could be, and consti-
tutionally must be, rationalized through detailed sentencing instruc-
tions, 17 the Furman Court seemed to suggest that just such guidance 
was necessary to save the death penalty - if it could be saved18 - in 
light of the apparent arbitrary and discriminatory aspects of prevailing 
death penalty practices. 
Legislative guidance presumably would ensure that individual sen-
tencing decisions reflected the values of the larger community because 
the state would announce in advance its "theory" of when death should 
be imposed.19 Such legislative guidance promised to address two dis-
tinct problems. First, clear standards would limit the risk that "unde-
serving" defendants would be sentenced to death because their particu-
lar juries concluded, contrary to the values of the community as a 
whole, that the defendant before them was among the truly worst of-
fenders. This problem of "overinclusion" was exacerbated in the pre-
Furman era by the availability of the death penalty for crimes such as 
rape and robbery, which, though undoubtedly very serious crimes, in-
creasingly were regarded as meriting a lesser punishment than death by 
the wider community.20 
great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and ... there is no meaningful ba-
sis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in 
which it is not"). 
16. 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) (describing the pre-Furman capital 
statutes as "pregnant with discrimination" in their operation). 
17. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) ("To identify before the 
fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the 
death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly un-
derstood and applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond 
present human ability."). 
18. Many observers, both on and off the Court, believed that Furman was the end 
of the death penalty in the United States. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., con-
curring) (stating that "capital punishment . . . has for all practical purposes run its 
course"). 
19. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections 
on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. 
R.Ev. 355, 365 (1995). 
20. After Furman, the Justices who upheld the revised Georgia statute in Gregg v. 
Georgia cited the Georgia Supreme Court's invalidation of the death penalty for armed 
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Second, clear standards would ensure that all potentially "deserv-
ing" defendants would be subject to the same sentencing criteria rather 
than the ad-hoc criteria adopted on a case-by-case basis by juries af-
forded absolute and unguided discretion. Legislative guidance thus held 
out the possibility that like cases would be treated alike. Not only 
would all undeserving defendants escape the death penalty; the hope 
was that clear legislative direction would ensure that all deserving de-
fendants received it as well. 
States responded to Furman's critique of standardless discretion in 
roughly two ways. Some states appeared to read Furman as requiring 
the removal of sentencing discretion altogether and accordingly enacted 
mandatory statutes that required and not merely permitted the death 
penalty for certain offenses.21 Most states, however, revamped their stat-
utes to increase substantially the structure of the sentencing decision 
while at the same time preserving some sentencer discretion to choose 
between life and death.22 In these states, the previously broad injunc-
tions to jurors to decide punishment in accordance with their " 'most 
profound judgment' " 23 or their "dictates of conscience"24 were re-
placed with formulas involving consideration of "aggravating" and 
"mitigating" factors or "special issues." These latter statutes have 
emerged as the sole constitutionally permissible vehicles for deciding 
punishment in capital cases. Having invalidated the poles of standar-
dless discretion and discretionless standards, the Court has directed 
most of its regulatory efforts in the death penalty area to fine-tuning the 
permissible middle ground of "guided discretion." 
The resulting death penalty law has proven to be disastrous. As I 
have argued elsewhere, by focusing so single-mindedly on state efforts 
robbery as evidence of the state's progress in rationalizing the death penalty. See Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 205-06 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); 
428 U.S. at 224 (White, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, J., concurring in the 
judgment). The Court ultimately relied on widespread consensus that the death penalty 
was disproportionate for the crime of rape in striking down Georgia's provision for such 
punishment a year later in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592-97 (1977) (plurality 
opinion). 
21. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (reviewing Louisiana's 
mandatory statute); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (reviewing North 
Carolina's mandatory statute). 
22. See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (reviewing Florida's post-
Furman approach); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (reviewing Georgia's post-
Furman approach). 
23. This was the standard instruction given in Ohio and challenged in Crampton v. 
Ohio, the companion case to McGautha. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 290 
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Caldwell, 21 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ohio 
1939)). 
24. Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 879 (1962). 
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to refine sentencer discretion at the moment of decision, the Court has 
rejected or ignored several more promising means of addressing arbi-
trary and discriminatory death penalty practices.25 It should be clear to-
day if it was not in 1972 that quality representation, meaningful propor-
tionality review of death verdicts, and adequate opportunities for federal 
review of federal claims are essential to protect against undeserved and 
unequal applications of the death penalty. 
The problem with the current statutory embodiments of "guided 
discretion," however, is not simply that they do not go far enough to-
ward curing the ills identified in Furman. More fundamentally, contem-
porary death penalty instructions actually undermine the goals they pur-
port to advance. "Guidance" in the post-Furman statutes often comes 
in the form of mind-numbing details about the state's and the defend-
ant's respective burdens of proof in establishing or disproving the exis-
tence of aggravating and mitigating factors.26 Such instructions, along 
with highly technical directions about how to reach the ultimate ver-
dict,27 are neither easily understood nor particularly helpful in rational-
izing the death penalty decision. As recent empirical work has demon-
25. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 414-26 (describing regulatory pos-
sibilities apart from controlling sentencer discretion at the moment of decision). 
26. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(g) (1994) ("When the factual existence of 
an offered mitigating circumstance is in dispute, the defendant shall have the burden of 
interjecting the issue, but once it is interjected the state shall have the burden of dis-
proving the factual existence of that circumstance by a preponderance of the evi-
dence."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(c)(iii) (1982) (requiring proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt for aggravating circumstances and proof by a preponderance of the ev-
idence for mitigating circumstances); NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES§ 150.10, at 27 (1995) ("The existence of any mitigating 
circumstance must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, that is, the evi-
dence, taken as a whole must satisfy you - not beyond a reasonable doubt, but simply 
satisfy you - that any mitigating circumstance exists. . . . A juror may find that any 
mitigating circumstance exists by a preponderance of the evidence whether or not that 
circumstance was found to exist by all the jurors."). 
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(2)(a)-(c) (Harrison 1991) ("After 
hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render an advisory sentence to the 
court, based upon the following matters: (a) Whether sufficient aggravating circum-
stances exist as enumerated ... ; (b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist 
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and (c) Based on these 
considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or 
death."); TENN. COOE ANN. § 39-13-204(f)-(g)(l)(B) (1991) ("(f) If the jury unani-
mously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the 
state beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the jury unanimously determines that a statutory 
aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a rea-
sonable doubt but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the 
state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence 
shall be life imprisonment .... (g)(l) If the jury unanimously determines that: (A) At 
least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circum-
stances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt; and (B) Such circum-
2596 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2590 
strated,28 the complexity of current instructions is likely to steer 
sentencers away from the core issues they are expected to decide. 
Perhaps more importantly, the net effect of casting the death pen-
alty decision in complicated, math-laden vocabulary is to obscure for 
many jurors the fact that they do retain the ultimate moral decisionmak-
ing power over who lives and dies. Guided discretion, as it appears in 
contemporary statutes, can easily and wrongly be experienced as no dis-
cretion at all because such statutes invariably fail to instruct jurors in 
affirmative terms about the scope of their moral authority and obliga-
tion. Thus, despite the Court's insistence that capital sentencers must be 
permitted to return a life sentence based on particular mitigating aspects 
of the defendant's character, background, or crime,29 state schemes 
often push jurors toward the death penalty in cases in which individual 
jurors may not believe that death is deserved. As one commentator has 
aptly framed the problem, "giv[ing] a 'little' guidance to a death pen-
alty jury" poses the risk that "jurors [will] mistakenly conclud[e] that 
they are getting a 'lot' of guidance" thus diminishing "their personal 
moral responsibility for the sentencing decision. " 30 
Last, under the guise of fulfilling the Court's requirement of speci-
fying in advance the "worst" murders and murderers, states have 
promulgated aggravating factors that collectively cover virtually all 
cases.31 Hence, the apparent "guidance" in current schemes falsely sug-
gests to sentencers that "ordinary" murder cases are in fact extraordi-
nary ones. As in the pre-Furman regime, jurors are empowered to re-
turn a death verdict in almost any case, but now they are led to believe 
that they are in fact reserving the death penalty for a small class of es-
pecially deserving offenders. 
stance or circumstances have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating cir-
cumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; then the sentence shall be death."). 
28. See, e.g., William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and 
Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043, 1090-93 (1995) (discussing data that 
reveals juror misunderstanding of capital sentencing instructions); James Luginbuhl & 
Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 
IND. L.J. 1161, 1164-67 (1995) (discussing data suggesting that a substantial number of 
jurors in North Carolina did not understand that they could not consider nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstances; that they could consider nonstatutory mitigating circum-
stances; that they could consider mitigating factors that other jurors' rejected; and that 
mitigating factors need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt); Craig Haney, Taking 
Capital Jurors Seriously, 70 IND. L.J. 1223, 1229 (1995) (reporting that a majority of 
California jurors who had served in capital cases did not understand the concept of 
mitigation). 
29. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
30. Joseph L. Hoffman, Where's the Buck? - Juror Misperception of Sentencing 
Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1159 (1995). 
31. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 373-74. 
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One might conclude from these charges against contemporary state 
efforts to guide sentencing discretion that Justice Harlan was right to in-
sist that such efforts are doomed to fail. As Professor Robert Weisberg 
has argued, "the inevitably unsystematic, irreducibly personal moral el-
ements of the choice to administer the death penalty"32 render efforts to 
guide decisionmaking unhelpful at best and misleading or distorting at 
worst. On this view, the question is not whether to rationalize the death 
penalty so much as whether to retain it notwithstanding our inability to 
control the moment of decision. The debate would thus focus ultimately 
on the "significance" rather than the acknowledged "truth" of Justice 
Harlan's insight.33 
I share the view that Furman's general concerns about arbitrariness 
and discrimination cannot be fully met by refining the language in 
which the punishment decision is cast.34 My argument here is that cur-
rent sentencing instructions nonetheless could be improved by focusing 
on more narrow, achievable goals and by adopting an approach to capi-
tal sentencing that differs significantly from both the pre-Furman and 
post-Furman paradigms. The model instructions I propose seek to limit 
the class of the death eligible and at the same time seek to communicate 
to sentencers in clear terms the nature and scope of their decisionmak-
ing power. In this respect, the instructions seek to correct two central 
respective failings of the pre- and post-Furman paradigms. The 
"standardless discretion" approach em~odied in the pre-Furman stat-
utes offers no protection to those defendants who are not truly among 
the "worst" offenders. The "guided discretion" approach reflected in 
contemporary statutes structures the deatli penalty decision in ways that 
are unhelpful and misleading, thereby undermining sentencer 
accountability. 
Though I view these problems of proportionality and accountabil-
ity as addressable (if not fully correctable), I do not believe that capital 
sentencing instructions can meaningfully address a separate and perhaps 
overriding concern of Furman: fairness across cases. This conclusion 
rests partly on a recognition of the limits of legal language - Justice 
Harlan's point about our inability to capture in words the myriad con-
siderations related to the death penalty decision. Equally decisive, 
though, is the inherent arbitrariness in any scheme that affords the sen-
tencer wide discretion to consider mitigating factors.35 Fairness requires 
rules and constraints on discretion. Affording sentencers an unaccounta-
32. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. Cr. REv. 305, 393. 
33. Id. at 313. 
34. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 414. 
35. Id. at 389-93. 
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ble veto of the death penalty - a veto that can and will be used arbi-
trarily or discriminatorily in some cases - forecloses any aspiration to 
meaningful equality in capital sentencing.36 At the same time, such indi-
vidualized sentencing is a prerequisite to ensuring that the death penalty 
truly is deserved in particular cases. Thus, while individualized sentenc-
ing ensures one kind of fairness - proportionality - it undermines 
equal application of the law by allowing for unprincipled dispensations 
from the death penalty. In short, the general fairness and specific pro-
portionality concerns identified in Furman and subsequent cases cannot 
be simultaneously satisfied. 
Once this dilemma is fully recognized and embraced, we are left to 
choose between instructions that seek to impose significant structure on 
the sentencing decision in the quest for systematic fairness and instruc-
tions that preserve and highlight the discretionary moral judgment nec-
essary to proportional verdicts. My proposed instructions take the latter 
route. This choice is partly informed by my skepticism about the pros-
pects for securing overarching fairness and the contribution that sen-
tencing instructions can make in that regard. But my conclusion rests 
primarily on my belief that specific proportionality concerns in any case 
trump general fairness concerns: withholding the death penalty in cir-
cumstances in which it is not deserved is a more compelling moral goal 
than ensuring that the penalty is imposed in every case in which it is 
deserved. 
The "informed discretion" approach includes the following basic 
elements: 
a. states would define capital murder narrowly so as to limit the 
class of the death eligible during the guilt-innocence phase of capital 
trials; 
b. states would not enumerate aggravating and mitigating factors at 
the punishment phase, and thus would not instruct sentencers to balance 
or weigh such factors as the method of reaching their decision; 
c. states would instruct sentencers that the defendant's conviction 
for the crime of capital murder does not create a presumption that the 
death penalty is the appropriate punishment (thus, states would not 
frame the ultimate decision in terms of whether the sentencer finds mit-
igating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for a sentence less 
than death); 
36. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the 
Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE LJ. 835, 862-64 (1992) 
(book review). 
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d. states would instruct sentencers that the death penalty, as op-
posed to oth~r serious punishments such as life imprisonment, is re-
served only for those defendants who deserve the penalty and that the 
moral judgment of whether death is deserved remains entirely with 
them; that the determination whether death is deserved involves consid-
eration <tf any factor that suggests whether the defendant is or is not 
among the small· group of "worst" offenders; and that, in deciding 
whether the defendant deserves the death penalty, the sentencer is re-
quired to consider not only the circumstances surrounding the crime, 
but also aspects of the defendant's character, background, and capabili-
ties that bear on his culpability for the crime; 
e. states would inform sentencers of ·the full parameters of punish-
ment alternatives to the death penalty, including any information about 
the availability of parole or ·clemency for persons sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
To make the case for the proposed changes, I will first describe 
briefly in Parts I and II the structure of pre- and post-Furman capital 
decisiorurtaking and the weaknesses of those approaches. I then will set 
forth in Part III the specific rationales for each proposed reform. 
The scheme I propose raises a significant constitutional question. 
Can the death penalty be retained as a punishment if we abandon the 
pretense of providing meaningful guidance through detailed sentencing 
instructions? Would the reestablishment .of relatively unstructured pen-
alty phase deliberations similar to, but also importantly different from, 
those characteristic of pre-Furman schemes survive post-Furman 
scrutiny? 
From a purely doctrinal perspective, ~e answer seems relatively 
clear, albeit somewhat surprising given the complexity of current state 
statutes. Despite the Court's seeming embrace of the structured penalty 
'phase as an indispensable feature of constitutional state death penalty 
schemes in the 1976 cases,37 current doctrine apparently permits states 
to leave the sentencing decision entirely unstructured if death eligibility 
is established at the guilt-innocence phase through narrowed definitions 
of capital murder.38 This result follows in part from the Court's rejection 
of the proposition that states have an obligation to "channel" sentencer 
discretion independent of their obligation to narrow the class of the 
death eligible.39 Accordingly, the complicated formulae of contempo-
37. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 385. 
38. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 245-46 (1988) (permitting death eligi-
bility to be established at the.guilt-innocence phase of capital trials). 
39. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding that Georgia's scheme, in 
which the sentencer is not guided in its decisionmaking after identifying at least one 
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rary statutes, enacted in response to perceived constitutional constraints, 
remain in place as a function of state choice rather than actual federal 
fiat. 
The Court's flexibility on the procedural side is matched by its un-
willingness to subject the outcomes of such procedures to demanding 
scrutiny.,Notwithstanding Furman's much discussed concern about arbi-
trary and discriminatory death sentencing practices, the Court has em-
phatically rejected the notion that unequal outcomes among groups of 
defendants violate the Eighth Amendment or the Equal Protection 
Clause, even when such inequality is based on race.40 
These decisions together suggest that the concern for equality 
across cases already has dropped out as a constitutional prerequisite to 
the administration of capital punishment. Whether these developments 
are viewed as an unfortunate abandonment of the concerns of Furman 
and the 1976 cases,41 or as a realistic accommodation of various com-
peting goals in the capital punishment jurisprudence,42 it seems that the 
return to relatively unstructured capital sentencing would not run afoul 
of current doctrine. 
statutory aggravating circumstance, is constitutional as applied to a defendant whose 
jury considered an impermissibly vague aggravating circumstance before sentencing 
him to death); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53 (1984) (reaffirming that once a state has 
limited the class of the death eligible "to a small sub-class" of defendants, the state has 
no further obligation to ensure equality in sentencing). 
40. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (rejecting Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment challenges to the administration of the death penalty in Georgia 
based on statistical evidence that revealed disparate treatment of defendants along racial 
lines, particularly in light of the race of the victim). 
41. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1134-35 (1994) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) ("It seems that the decision whether a human being should live or die is so 
inherently subjective - rife with all of life's understandings, experiences, prejudices, 
and passions - that it inevitably defies the rationality and consistency required by the 
Constitution."); Zant, 462 U.S. at 910 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Today we learn for 
the first time that the Court did not mean what it said in Gregg v. Georgia. We now 
learn that the actual decision whether a defendant lives or dies may still be left to the 
unfettered discretion of the jury."); Weisberg, supra note 32, at 395 ("In its own 
clumsy and often dishonest way, and perhaps for illegitimate reasons, the Supreme 
Court seems to have decided that it no longer wants to use constitutional law to foster 
legal formulas for regulating moral choice at the penalty trial."). 
42. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319 ("The Constitution does not require that 
a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially irrelevant 
factor in order to operate a criminal justice system that includes capital punishment. As 
we have stated specifically in the context of capital punishment, the Constitution does 
not 'plac[e] totally unrealistic conditions on its use.' ") (alteration in original) (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
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The state statutes in force at the time of Furman left the punish-
ment decision in capital cases entirely unstructured. Indeed, most states 
did not establish a separate proceeding for assessing punishment and 
simply directed capital juries to decide punishment at the same time 
that they considered whether the defendant had in fact committed the 
crime.43 Illustrative of state statutes was Ohio's instruction exhorting ju-
rors to rely on their "profound judgment" in choosing between death 
and some lesser punishment.44 Virtually all states employed similarly 
vague phrases that told the jury that the decision was important but not 
much else. 45 Exacerbating the absence of standards for choosing be-
tween death and imprisonment was the range of available punishments 
within the jurors' discretion. Georgia's rape statute challenged in 
Furman, for example, allowed the jury to choose between death at one 
extreme and one year's imprisonment at the other.46 
The basic problems with standardless discretion can be grouped 
around three related ideas: notice, general fairness, and proportionality. 
The notice problem stems from the state's failure to communicate its 
underlying theory for choosing the death penalty in some cases and not 
others. Despite the state's judgment that death is not appropriate for all 
persons convicted of capital crimes - as evidenced by its nonmanda-
tory statute - the state has not specified in advance any of the grounds 
for withholding such punishment. 
The value of notice usually carries little weight absent a tie to reli-
ance or fairness. In the capital context, a defendant would be hard 
pressed to insist that he deserved advance notice about when the death 
penalty would be imposed in order to structure his affairs - that is, to 
decide the circumstances under which he could commit murder or rape 
43. Thirty-four of the 41 states in which juries decided punishment in capital cases 
did not bifurcate proceedings at the time McGautha was decided. Weisberg, supra note 
32, at 309 & n.14 (citing Project, A Study of the California Penalty Jury in First-
Degree-Murder Cases, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1297, 1307 & n.10, 1432-38 (1969)). 
44. See State v. Caldwell, 21 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ohio 1939) (providing standard in-
struction for sentencing in capital cases). 
45. See, e.g., Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla.)., cert. denied, 371 U.S. 
879 (1962) (Florida instructions made clear that the decision to impose death or a lesser 
punishment was to be "determined purely by the dictates of the consciences of the indi-
vidual jurors"); People v. Bernette, 197 N.E.2d 436, 443 (Ill. 1964) (stating that capital 
punishment is "an optional form of punishment which [the jury is] free to select or re-
ject as it [sees] fit"); State v. Mount, 152 A.2d 343, 351 (N.J. 1959) (indicating that the 
decision to impose death is at the "absolute discretion of the jury upon its consideration 
of all the evidence"). 
46. See GA. CODE ANN.§ 26-1302 (Supp. 1971). 
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without risk of execution. Society certainly has an interest in specifying 
in advance its conception of the "worst" murders as a means of deter-
ring precisely those crimes, but a defendant who has general warning 
about the availability of severe punishments including death for certain 
crimes cannot plausibly claim a strong reliance ground for withholding 
the death penalty. 47 
The more substantial notice claim concerns fairness. If states be-
lieve that death is not warranted for all persons convicted of murder or 
rape, but nonetheless leave the ultimate determination in the unstruc-
tured and unreviewable discretion of particular juries, there is no guar-
antee that all similarly situated defendants will be treated equally. Dif-
ferent juries will be persuaded by different kinds of evidence and 
argument, and the death penalty will presumably tum in large part on 
whether a defendant fortuitously finds himself before a jury whose op-
erative "theory" places him on the side of imprisonment rather than 
death. 
As the petitioner argued in McGautha, the fairness concerns are es-
pecially compelling when the death penalty, although available in an 
extraordinary number of cases, is imposed rarely.48 In such circum-
stances, the community, speaking through particular juries, exempts the 
vast majority of persons eligible for the death penalty for a variety of 
unspecified reasons. When a defendant does receive the death penalty 
in such a scheme, there is no basis for knowing whether it was his case 
or his jury that was truly exceptional. Thus, the absence of standards 
coupled with the rare imposition of the death penalty raises the possibil-
ity that those persons sentenced to death would not merit such punish-
ment according to the values of the wider community. Hence, the impo-
sition of the death penalty in such circumstances would not only be 
unfair - in the sense that equally undeserving persons were spared -
but also disproportionate. 
The rarity of executions also could suggest that virtually all execu-
tions are disproportionate according to community standards. On this 
account, though the death penalty remains on the books, the community 
depends on juries to withhold the punishment, and the infrequency with 
which death is actually imposed forestalls legislative reform. Hence, 
47. See, e.g., Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting claim by 
defendant that he did not have fair notice of death eligibility for murder committed in 
the course of attempted rape on the ground that "[i]t would carry legal fiction to offen-
sive lengths to speculate that [the defendant] was inveigled by the Illinois legislature 
into killing his victim when he did because he reasonably believed that he could not be 
punished for capital felony murder"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 433 (1994). 
48. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 203-04 (1971). 
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discretionary decisionmaking could actually conceal declining support 
of the death penalty in the larger community.49 
As discussed above, these concerns regarding the absence of stan-
dards as well as the infrequent imposition of the death penalty led the 
Court to invalidate existing death penalty schemes in Furman. The 
states responded swiftly (eliminating doubts about sufficient legislative 
"will" to sustain the death penalty50) and the resulting statutes sought 
to provide the structure thought to be necessary to survive the Court's 
further scrutiny. 
II. GUIDED DISCRETION IN THE POST-FURMAN WORLD: TELLING 
SENTENCERS Too MUCH AND Too LITTLE 
A. The Mechanics of Post-Furman Sentencing 
The new statutes passed in the wake of Furman differ in many de-
tails but can be roughly grouped as mandatory statutes, factor statutes, 
and special issue schemes. The mandatory statutes provide the ultimate 
guidance to jurors because they involve no separate consideration of 
punishment; rather, the statutes require imposition of the death penalty 
for certain crimes. Although some members of the Court seemed to in-
vite this response in their Furman opinions,51 the Court subsequently 
ruled that capital defendants are entitled to an "individualized" pro-
ceeding in which sentencers consider mitigating evidence offered in 
support of a sentence less than death.52 
49. By the late 1960s, the Supreme Court, relying on public-opinion polls, sug-
gested that support for the death penalty was in sharp decline. See Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968) ("Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of 
capital punishment - of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme penalty 
- such a jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority.") (citing a 1966 
poll in which only 42% of the American public favored capital punishment for con-
victed murderers). 
50. Thirty-five states and the federal government passed new statutes over the next 
four years. See Jordan Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall 
and the Death Penalty, 71 TEXAS L. REv. 1131, 1136-37 (1993) (describing the states' 
reaction to Furman). 
51. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 u:s. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I 
find it unnecessary to reach the ultimate question" whether "infliction of the death pen-
alty is constitutionally impermissible in all circumstances."); 408 U.S. at 310 (White, J., 
concurring) ("The facial constitutionality of statutes requiring the imposition of the 
death penalty for first-degree murder, for more narrowly defined categories of murder, 
or for rape would present quite different issues under the Eighth Amendment than are 
posed by the cases before us."). 
52. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Rob-
erts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
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The two remaining alternatives - factor statutes and special issue 
schemes - seek in varying degrees to provide greater structure to de-
liberations on the issue of punishment through a separate penalty phase 
of the trial. Hence, one hallmark of contemporary death penalty law is 
the universal establishment of bifurcated proceedings. Bifurcation is 
significant for two reasons. First, by removing the issue of punishment 
from the guilt-innocence trial, bifurcation avoids putting the defendant 
to the difficult choice of denying guilt, on the one hand, and accepting 
responsibility and presenting mitigating evidence, on the other. More 
importantly, bifurcation communicates to the sentencer that the punish-
ment decision is a serious one that deserves separate, focused attention. 
Thus, despite the Court's emphatic rejection of the claim in McGautha 
that bifurcation is constitutionally compelled via the Due Process 
Clause or as a corollary to the Fifth Amendment's protection against 
compelled self-incrimination,53 all states that did not enact mandatory 
statutes adopted bifurcated proceedings in the wake of Furman partly as 
a means of acknowledging the heightened significance of the death pen-
alty decision. 
1. Factor Statutes 
The defining feature of most post-Furman statutes is the enumera-
tion of "aggravating" (and in most cases "mitigating") factors to guide 
sentencer discretion. These factor statutes require the sentencer to find 
the existence of at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance in or-
der to return a sentence of death. In so-called "weighing" states, such 
as Mississippi,54 the sentencer is explicitly instructed to weigh or bal-
ance aggravating against mitigating factors to reach a sentencing deci-
sion.55 In "threshold" states, such as Georgia,56 after the sentencer iden-
tifies at least one aggravating factor, the aggravating factors do not play 
a specific or defined role in sentencing; rather, the sentencer is thereaf-
ter basically unguided in reaching the ultimate verdict. 
53. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208-20 (1971) (rejecting the argu-
ment that bifurcated capital proceedings are constitutionally compelle,d). 
54. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 99-19-101 to -107 (1994). 
55. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 99-19-101(3) (1994) ("For the jury to impose a sentence 
of death, it must unanimously find ... [t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circum-
stances ... to outweigh the aggravating circumstances."). 
56. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983) ("Thus, in Georgia, the 
finding of an aggravating circumstance does not play any role in guiding the sentencing 
body in the exercise of its discretion, apart from its function of narrowing the class of 
persons convicted of murder who are eligible for the death penalty."). 
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Despite Supreme Court doctrine to the contrary,57 the "weighing" 
and "threshold" approaches are essentially the same.58 They both call 
attention to state-endorsed factors that purportedly distinguish especially 
blameworthy or dangerous offenders from ordinary ones. More signifi-
cantly, they both suggest to the sentencer that the ultimate decision can 
and should be broken down into component parts. As a result, both 
weighing and nonweighing factor approaches run the risk of obscuring 
the overarching moral question of desert to which the component parts 
are primarily directed. 
Factor statutes (whether "weighing" or "threshold") often provide 
additional, highly technical instructions regarding the burden of proving 
or disproving aggravating or mitigating factors. Alabama, for example, 
instructs the sentencer that the defendant is entitled to offer any mitigat-
ing circumstance, and further states that "[w]hen the factual existence 
of an offered mitigating circumstance is in dispute, the defendant shall 
have the burden of interjecting the issue, but once it is interjected the 
state shall have the burden of disproving the factual existence of that 
circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. " 59 In a. similar vein, 
North Carolina sets up different burdens for sentencer consideration of 
aggravating and mitigating factors, holding the former to the "reasona-
ble doubt standard" while requiring the sentencer to find the latter only 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 60 
Many factor statutes establish a presumption in favor of death 
upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance. Idaho's statute, for ex-
ample, provides that " [ w ]here the court finds a statutory aggravating 
circumstance the court shall sentence the defendant to death unless the 
court finds that mitigating circumstances which may be presented are 
57. Compare Zant, 462 U.S. at 890 (holding that the invalidation of an aggravat-
ing circumstance does not require reversal of the death penalty in a nonweighing juris-
diction) with Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 (1990) (holding that some form 
of appeIJate reweighing or harmless error analysis is required to save a death verdict af-
ter a jury considered an impermissible aggravator in a weighing state). 
58. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 386-87 & n.153 (criticizing the pur-
ported difference between weighing and nonweighing statutes); Stephen Hornbuckle, 
Note, Capital Sentencing Procedure: A Lethal Oddity in the Supreme Court's Case Law, 
73 TEXAS L. REv. 441, 455-57 (1994) ·(same); cf Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700, 704 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (in response to petitioner's assertion that the jury should have been told that 
it was to weigh the aggravating against the mitigating factors, the court concluded that 
"[i]t is obvious that when one is asked to consider pro and con considerations one is 
being asked to compare and thus in a sense weigh them" and that "[b]elaboring the ob-
vious is not a reliable formula for enlightenment"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 433 (1994). 
59. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(g) (1994). 
60. NORTH CAROLINA PA'ITERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES 
§ 150.10, at 27 (1995). 
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sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust. " 61 Other 
statutes, notably California's and Pennsylvania's, require the sentencer 
to return a death verdict upon a finding of at least one aggravating and 
no mitigating circumstances.62 These latter statutes were recently chal-
lenged on the ground that, in certain cases, a sentencer might not regard 
death as the appropriate punishment notwithstanding the presence of at 
least one aggravating and no mitigating factors.63 The Supreme Court 
rejected this claim, though, insisting that states could enact schemes 
with some "mandatory" aspects as long as they also permit the consid-
eration of mitigating evidence. 64 
One important characteristic of the quasi-mandatory schemes 
adopted by Pennsylvania and California is shared by all factor statutes 
and hence by virtually all statutes currently in force: the sentencer never 
is asked directly whether the defendant deserves to die. Nor do such 
statutes ask directly whether the defendant should be executed to 
achieve some other social goal, such as incapacitation or deterrence. In-
stead, the states' theories concerning when death should be imposed are 
communicated obliquely through the enumeration of certain kinds of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The "ultimate questions" in 
such statutes invariably refrain from informing the sentencer of any 
overarching penological concerns to which the enumerated circum-
stances are connected. They either instruct the sentencer to weigh ag-
gravating factors against mitigating factors in some fashion or they sim-
ply direct the sentencer to reach a decision. 
2. Special Issue Statutes 
Until recently, the two special issue statutes enacted in Texas and 
Oregon differed significantly from the factor statutes in that they did 
not ask the sentencer an "ultimate question" at all. Instead, Texas and 
Oregon required the sentencer to answer two and sometimes three spe-
cial issues relating to the deliberateness of the defendant's conduct, the 
probability of the defendant committing violent acts in the future, and 
the extent to which the defendant acted in response to perceived provo-
61. IDAHO CODE§ 19-2515(c) (Supp. 1995). 
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 97ll(c)(iv) (1982). 
63. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 
U.S. 299 (1990). 
64. See Blystone, 494 U.S. at 303-05. 
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cation.65 If all of the answers to the questions were affirmative, the ver-
dict was death. 
In many respects, the special issue schemes seemed to suffer from 
the same defect that the Court identified in the mandatory statutes in-
validated in 1976:66 the schemes did not provide a particularly clear or 
promising vehicle for sentencer consideration of mitigating circum-
stances. Nonetheless, the Court provisionally sustained Texas's special 
issue scheme against a facial challenge on the hope that the issues 
would be construed broadly enough to ensure individualized sentenc-
ing. 67 Over a decade later, the Court concluded that the Texas statute 
was unconstitutional as applied to a defendant with mental retardation 
because the special issues did not afford the sentencer adequate oppor-
tunity to give mitigating effect to the defendant's limited intellectual ca-
pacity. 68 Both Texas and Oregon responded to the Court's decision by 
adding an additional open-ended special issue that essentially permits 
sentencer consideration of any mitigating factors. 69 
Accordingly, the special issue schemes today function much like 
the factor statutes in the sense that they permit sentencer consideration 
of the functional equivalent of aggravating factors as well as any miti-
gating evidence. In addition, the new special issue in the Texas scheme 
mirrors the ultimate question asked in a number of factor statutes: 
"Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the 
circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background, 
and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient 
mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of 
life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed. " 7° From a 
sheer numerical perspective, the special issue schemes seem to be more 
favorable toward capital defendants because they do not enumerate a 
laundry list of aggravating circumstances, any one of which would be 
65. See OR. REv. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b) (1987) (current amended version at OR. 
REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b) (1995)); TEX. CRIM. PR.oc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (West 
1981) (current amended version at TEX. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (West 
Supp. 1996)). 
66. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
67. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
68. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989). 
69. Texas did so by statute, Act of June 16, 1991, ch. 838, sec. I, art. 37.071(e)-
(g), 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 2898, 2899-900 (codified as amended at TEX. CRIM. PR.oc. 
CODE ANN. art. 37.071.2(e)-(g) (West Supp. 1996)), whereas Oregon did so by judicial 
refonnation of the statute, followed by statutory codification, Act of July 24, 1989, ch. 
790, sec. 135b, § 163.150(1)(b)(B)-(c), 1989 Or. Laws 1301, 1327 (codified as amended 
at OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(D)-(c)(B) (1995)). 
70. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071.2(e) (West Supp. 1996). 
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sufficient to support a death sentence. On the other hand, the future 
dangerousness question that is the centerpiece of the special issue stat-
utes is facially broad,71 and could reasonably apply to virtually any of-
fender. Indeed, given sentencer concerns about incapacitation, the spe-
cial issue schemes arguably increase the likelihood of death verdicts by 
establishing a presumption that "dangerous" offenders should be exe-
cuted an~ thus deflecting attention from the question of desert. 
B. The Failings of Post-Furman Sentencing ~chemes 
1. Lack of Meaningful Guidance 
One of the more obvious failings of the post-Furman statutes con-
cerns the extent to which they truly "guide" sentencer discretion. The 
guidance in such statutes purportedly occurs at two levels. First, the 
state's enumeration of aggravating factors or their functional equivalent 
seeks to inform the sentencer of the principal considerations calling for 
extreme punishment. Second, the state's procedural rules regarding the 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors and the manner in 
which the verdict should be reached attempt to lend structure and con-
sistency to sentencers' deliberations. 
a. Enumeration of Aggravating Factors and Special Issues. The 
first form of guidance has been undermined significantly by the 
proliferation of vague aggravating factors and special issues that argua-
bly apply to most offenses and offenders. In the wake of Furman, many 
states believed that the surest path to compliance was to follow the lead 
of the Model Penal Code,12 which unfortunately had endorsed the "es-
pecially heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor as a means of isolating the 
worst murders and murderers.73 The factor seems implicitly to recognize 
that most murders are "heinous, atrocious or cruel" by requiring the 
sentencer to find that the crime before them was "especially" so before 
triggering death eligibility. But asking a sentencer to separate the "espe-
cially" heinous from the "ordinarily" heinous crimes does not guide 
the sentencer at all. Nonetheless, though the Court has invalidated some 
capital verdicts based on the use of impermissibly vague aggravators,74 
it has sustained others where states have adopted purported limiting 
71. The future dangerousness issue reads as follows: "whether there is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would con-
stitute a continuing threat to society." TEX. CRIM. PR.cc. CODE ANN. art. 
37.071.2(b)(l) (West Supp. 1996). 
72. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 210.6(3)(h) (1980). 
73. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 387 & n.155. 
74. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990); Godfrey v. Georgia, 
446 U.S. 420 (1980). 
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constructions75 or where the facially vague aggravator was not thought 
to affect the ultimate decision.76 As a result, many states have failed to 
purge dubious aggravators from their schemes. 
Moreover, many states have adopted numerous aggravating cir-
cumstances.77 Thus, even in state schemes that rely primarily on objec-
tive, nonvague aggravating factors, such as committing murder in the 
course of a felony,78 or killing a police officer,79 the factors collectively 
suffer from the same defect as individual factors that are impermissibly 
vague. Instead of guiding sentencers toward a particular "theory" of the 
worst murders, they seem to indiscriminately describe the circumstances 
surrounding most murders. Empirical work reflects this dynamic, as vir-
tually all persons sentenced to death in Georgia before Furman would 
have been deemed death eligible under Georgia's post-Furman statute.80 
As Justice Harlan argued in McGautha, this problem may be una-
voidable. For states to provide meaningful guidance, they must limit the 
considerations surrounding the decision. But in the capital context, such 
limits seem artificial, because states· and sentencers fairly regard the 
range of relevant considerations to be quite broad. Even the draftsmen 
of the Model Penal Code acknowledged that " 'the factors which deter-
mine whether the sentence of death is the appropriate penalty in partic-
ular cases are too complex to be compressed within the limits of a sim-
ple formula.' " 81 
75. See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993) (sustaining Idaho's use of 
the factor focusing on whether the defendant exhibited "utter disregard for human life" 
based on the "limiting construction" that confined the factor to "cold-blooded, pitiless 
slayer[s)") (internal quotation marks omitted); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) 
(upholding Arizona's use of "especially heinous, cruel or depraved" factor against as-
applied challenge). 
76. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (holding that the inclusion of 
an impermissibly vague aggravator was not constitutional error so long as a separate, 
constitutionally valid aggravator remained). 
77. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-703(F) (Supp. 1995) (listing 10 aggra-
vating circumstances); Cow. REv. STAT. § 16-11-103(5) (Supp. 1995) (listing 13 ag-
gravating Circumstances); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(5) (Harrison Supp. 1995) (list-
ing 12 aggravating circumstances); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1) (1995) (listing 17 
aggravating circumstances). 
78. See, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § ?C:ll-3.c(4)(g) (West 1995) ("The offense was 
committed while the defendant was engaged in ... flight after committing or attempting 
to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary or kidnapping .... "). 
79. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(5)0) (Harrison Supp. 1995); s.c. 
CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(7) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995). 
80. See DAVID c. BALDUS ET AL .. EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 268 n.31 (1990). 
81. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt. 3 at 71 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959) 
(quoting ROYAL COMMN. ON CAP. PUNISHMENT, REPORT 174 (1953)), quoted in 
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 205 (1971). 
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The breadth of relevant sentencing considerations is particularly 
apparent on the mitigating side. In response to the Court's decisions 
elaborating the requirement of individualized sentencing, 82 every state 
currently allows unbridled consideration of mitigating factors. Although 
most states enumerate a short list of mitigating factors,83 the list is inev-
itably expanded by a "catch-all" that allows the defendant to present, 
and the sentencer to consider, any additional circumstances that call for 
a sentence less than death.84 Thus, whatever limited guidance is 
achieved on the aggravating side is undermined by the ,uncircumscribed 
discretion that is constitutionally mandated on the mitigating side. 
Accordingly, there is little "guidance" and much "discretion" in 
post-Furman sentencing schemes. States simply have not developed re-
fined theories of capital sentencing that would permit any significant 
constraint on sentencer decisionmaking. The enumeration of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors might have some heuristic value in delineat-
ing the kinds of considerations that are pertinent to the ultimate deci-
sion, but they surely do not fulfill the ambitious goal of ensuring that 
like cases are treated alike. The net of death eligibility remains remark-
ably broad, and the enumerated factors tell sentencers remarkably little 
about which defendants should and should not receive the ultimate 
punishment. 
b. Decision Rules in Capital Statutes. States also have sought to 
guide sentencer discretion by promulgating various types of decision 
82. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (invalidating death sentence based 
on the failure of Texas special issue scheme to facilitate consideration of defendant's 
mental retardation and history of being abused); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 
(1987) (condemning Florida's exclusion of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances from 
sentencer consideration); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (reversing death 
sentence based on state judge's refusal to assign any mitigating weight to the defend-
ant's turbulent family history and emotional disturbance); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) (invalidating mandatory death penalty). 
83. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 921.141(6) 
(Harrison Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.032.3 (Vernon Supp. 1996). The six 
states that do not enumerate mitigating circumstances are Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 4209(c)(l) (1995); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1990); IDAHO CODE§ 19-2515(c) (Supp. 1995); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10.C (West Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-
27A-1 (Supp. 1996); Tux. CRIM. PR.cc. CODE ANN. art. 37.071.2(e) (West Supp. 
1996). 
84. Some states provide a catch-all. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(k) 
(West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 16-11-103(4)(1) (Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. CODE art. 
27, § 413(g)(8) (1992). Most states, however, before their enumeration of mitigating 
circumstances, make clear that the enumerated list is not intended to be exhaustive. See, 
e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1994) ("Mitigating circumstances shall include, but not 
be limited to, the following .... "); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 5-4-605 (Michie 1993) (same); 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-l(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (same). 
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rules that specify the circumstances under which aggravating and miti-
gating factors can be considered and the procedure for reaching an ulti-
mate verdict. The apparent goal of such instructions is to ensure that 
sentencers approach their decision systematically and with due regard to 
the reliability of the facts on which the decision is made. 
The "threshold" consideration instructions adopted in several 
states are valuable to the extent that they require sentencers to find ag-
gravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 85 Such instructions 
contribute to proportional sentencing by demanding a high level of 
proof before the defendant crosses the line into death eligibility. On the 
other hand, instructions that establish some minimum threshold for the 
consideration of mitigating evidence, such as a preponderance of evi-
dence standard,86 do not meaningfully contribute to reliability in 
sentencing. 
As an initial matter, it is not obvious what it means to "find" the 
existence of a mitigating circumstance to a certain level of proof. A 
sentencer might read such instructions to refer to the proof regarding 
some underlying "fact" such as whether the defendant had been the 
victim of abuse or possessed abnormally low intelligence. A sentencer 
also might read such instructions, however, to invite an assessment of 
whether facts acknowledged to be true actually "mitigated" the crime 
to a substantial degree. 81 
Under either scenario, the instructions do not contribute to reliabil-
ity. If the sentencer is only marginally persuaded of the existence of 
mitigating facts that, if true, would significantly affect the sentencer's 
ultimate decision - for example, that the defendant was not the trig-
gerperson and did not intend to kill in a felony murder case - there is 
little purpose served by precluding consideration of those facts. The 
85. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 971 l(c)(iii) (1982) (requiring proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt for aggravating circumstances). 
86. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(iii) (1982) (requiring proof by 
a preponderance of the evidence for mitigating circumstances); NORTH CAROLINA 
PATIERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES§ 150.10, at 27 (1995) ("The 
existence of any mitigating circumstance must be established by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that is, the evidence, taken as a whole must satisfy you - not beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, but simply satisfy you - that any mitigating circumstance exists .... A 
juror may find that any mitigating circumstance exists by a preponderance of the evi-
dence whether or not that circumstance was found to exist by all the jurors."). 
87. A similar ambiguity is not likely to occur on the aggravating side because 
sentencers ordinarily do not approach aggravating factors with the same level of skepti-
cism with which they approach mitigating factors. Virtually all sentencers would agree 
with - or at least accept - the proposition that murders in the course of a felony, or 
murders involving more than one victim, or murders committed while in lawful cus-
tody, for example, can be deemed more serious than murders perpetrated without such 
circumstances. 
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power of mitigating evidence is a function of both the strength of the 
factual predicate and the moral significance of those possibly true facts. 
Thus, even contested factual predicates should play a role in the sen-
tencing decision if the moral significance of those facts is sufficiently 
great. On the other hand, if the instruction is inte!)ded to require the 
sentencer to make an initial assessment of the significance of accepted 
facts, the instruction is of marginal value. The instruction essentially 
asks the sentencer to place no weight on facts that otherwise might be 
assigned little weight. 
Apart from their limited usefulness, these threshold provisions for 
the consideration of mitigating evidence reveal a central conceptual 
flaw of the post-Furman statutes. Precluding sentencer consideration of 
mitigating evidence that is not established by a preponderance of the 
evidence makes sense only if the ultimate verdict rests on a quantitative 
rather than a qualitative comparison of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances. If we care about the sheer number of mitigating circum-
stances found by the sentencer, we would be more inclined toward re-
quiring some initial threshold of reliability. If, however, the sentencing 
decision is ultimately a qualitative judgment about the comparative 
strength of various aggravating and mitigating factors, establishing a 
threshold requirement for consideration arbitrarily excludes concededly 
relevant information. 
One of the risks of the post-Furman factor schemes is that they in-
vite precisely the sort of wooden, numerical decisionmaking that thresh-
old consideration requirements seem to presuppose. Indeed, in the 
Court's decisions concerning the effect of sentencer consideration of 
impermissible aggravating factors on resulting death verdicts, the devel-
oping doctrine implicitly acknowledges the special weight sentencers 
are likely to place on the raw number of aggravating factors in certain 
circumstances. The Court has held that courts in "weighing" states may 
not apply "an automatic rule of affirmance" to save a death verdict 
when the sentencer considered unconstitutionally vague aggravators be-
cause doing so "would not give defendants the individualized treatment 
that would result from actual reweighing of the mix of mitigating fac-
tors and aggravating circumstances. " 88 This is true despite the fact that 
states need not structure sentencing deliberations at all once death eligi-
88. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752, 754 (1990) (requiring some fonn 
of appellate reweighing or hannless error analysis to save a death verdict after the jury 
considered an impcnnissible aggravator). · 
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bility has been established.89 Thus, if a state decides to give more struc-
ture to the punishment decision than the Constitution requires, it cannot 
use that structure to tip the sca1es toward death with vague factors that 
are potentia1ly applicable to every case. 
If a state does not explicitly require the sentencer to weigh or ba1-
ance aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencer's consideration of 
an impermissibly vague aggravator does not require reversa1 of a death 
sentence.90 The difference in these results makes sense only if one be-
lieves that sentencers, when asked directly to ·weigh or balance aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances, are particularly likely to be influ-
enced by the sheer number of aggravating factors that they find. 
Even in "threshold" states, though, sentencers are likely to place 
great weight on the factor framework precisely because it is the sole 
state-endorsed means of approaching the decision. As recent work has 
demonstrated, jurors in capita1 cases are often uncomfortable with de-
ciding whether a defendant lives or dies and, as a consequence, are ea-
ger to find state-imposed constraints - even illusory ones - to ground 
their decision.91 Mere "numbers" are thus likely to matter ~o sentencers 
in the absence of explicit instructions connecting the enumerated factors 
to the overriding mora1 and penological concerns surrounding the pun-
ishment decision such as retribution, incapacitation, or deterrence. In 
those few states in which sentencers are cautioned not to simply com-
pare factors numerica1ly, the "anti-quantitative" instruction given as a 
corrective92 still manages to suggest a greater degree of mathematica1 
precision to their decisionmaking process than is warranted.93 • 
2. Confusion and Illusory Guidance 
One essentia1 problem with factor statutes is that they paradoxi-
cally make the decision to impose or withhol~ the death penalty both 
89. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (sustaining Georgia's scheme which 
affords absolute discretion to sentencer after death eligibility is established through a 
finding of at least one statutory aggravating· circumstance). 
90. 462 U.S. at 889-91. 
91. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 1142-56 (discussing juror accounts of deci-
sionmaking in capital cases). 
92. See, e.g., NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL 
CASES § 150.10, at 42-43 (1995) ("You should not merely add up the number of aggra-
vating circumstances and mitigating circumstances. Rather, you must decide from all 
the evidence what value to give to each circumstance, and then weigh the aggravating 
circumstances, so valued, against the mitigating circumstances, so valued, and finally 
determine whether the mitigating circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggra-
vating circumstances."). 
93. See infra text accompanying notes 114-23 (discussing the limitations ofifram-
ing the death penalty decision in terms of aggravating and mitigating circumstances). 
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harder and easier than it is or should be. The statutes make the decision 
harder because they are laden with jargon· and formulae that lay persons 
cannot easily understand or apply. At the same time, they give the illu-
sion that the decision can be reduced to a formula that obviates the need 
for the exercise of mon)l judgment. 
a. Juror Misunderstanding. Recent empirical studies by the Capital 
Juror Project confirm the extent to which jurors cannot make sense of 
the new, guided discretion statutes.94 For example, a significant number 
of jurors who had served in capital cases in North Carolina were later 
found not to understand the basic operation of the state statute, includ-
ing whether they could consider nonstatutory aggravating factors or 
mitigating factors, whether mitigating factors had to be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and whether mitigating factors could be considered 
if they were not found unanimously.95 Jurors who served in other states 
have likewise demonstrated poor understanding of some crucial aspects 
of their instructions, such as whether they were required to impose the 
death penalty upon the finding of a particular aggravating circum-
stance.96 Along the same lines, researchers in California concluded that 
jurors as well as lawyers had difficulty defining, much less applying, 
the concept of mitigation, a central feature of all state death penalty 
schemes.97 
Not surprisingly, the claim that jurors do not understand the com-
plexity of current death penalty statutes appears not only in academic 
research but in capital punishment case law as well. An Illinois inmate 
94. The methodology of the Capital Jury Project is described in Bowers, supra 
note 28, at 1077-85. Basically, the Project conducted lengthy in-person interviews with 
randomly selected capital jurors who had served on capital juries since 1988. Of course, 
the major problem with such a methodology is that there is no guarantee that jurors' un-
derstanding of sentencing instructions at the time of the interviews will correspond per-
fectly to their understanding of the instructions at the time of their deliberations. See 
Valerie P. Hans, How Juries Decide Death: The Contributions of the Capital Jury Pro-
ject, 10 IND. L.J. 1233, 1238 (1995) (stating that "the use of interviews to study mis-
comprehension of judicial instructions is more problematic" than the use of such inter-
views to assess jurors understanding of their ultimate responsibility for their verdict). 
95. See Luginbuhl & Howe, supra note 28, at 1164-67. 
96. See Bowers, supra note 28, at 1090-91 (reporting that over 40% of jurors be-
lieved that the law required them to impose a death sentence if the evidence proved that 
the defendant's conduct was heinous, vile, or depraved). 
97. See Haney, supra note 28, at 1229 (reporting that "less than one-half of our 
subjects could provide even a partially correct definition of the term 'mitigation,' al-
most one-third provided definitions that bordered on being uninterpretable or incoher-
ent, and slightly more than one subject in 10 was still so mystified by the concept that 
he or she was unable to venture a guess about its meaning.") (citing Craig Haney & 
Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of Califor-
nia's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 411, 420-21 (1994)). 
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sought federal habeas relief from his death sentence based on a study 
purporting to show that the instructions given at his punishment phase 
proceeding were not likely to be understood by reasonable jurors.98 In 
particular, the petitioner claimed that the instructions did not suffi-
ciently communicate to jurors that they could consider nonstatutory mit-
igating factors in reaching their decision.99 The petitioner also argued 
that the jury was not given adequate guidance in weighing aggravating 
and mitigating factors. As support for his petition, the inmate intro-
duced a study in which persons called for jury duty. were randomly 
given a written test to assess their comprehension of the statutory in-
structions.100 A substantial number of the participants indicated that they 
read the instructions to preclude consideration of certain nonstatutory 
mitigating factors. 101 
Ironically, the thrust of one aspect of the petitioner's claim was 
that the jury needed more instruction, not less. Although Judge Posner's 
rejection of this argument salvaged the Illinois instructions, his com-
ments point to the limited value of the many statutes that do inform 
sentencers of varying burdens of proof and explicitly dirt'.ct sentencers 
to weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Comparing the ad-
ditional weighing instruction sought by the petitioner to instructions 
seeking greater precision in the "reasonable doubt" charge, Judge Pos-
ner insisted, in language recalling Justice Harlan, that "there is a point 
at which definition ceases to be enlightening and becomes 
confusing." 102 
Judge Posner's response to the other aspect of the petitioner's 
claim was less convincing. Reversing in part the district court deci-
sion, 103 he dismissed the results of the prospective juror survey on the 
grounds that the participants did not actually serve on capital juries and 
the study did not employ a control group in which "clearer" instruc-
tions were tested and compared.104 It is not at all apparent how sitting 
on a capital jury will render confusing sentencing instructions more ac-
cessible, especially given that most jurisdictions do not permit the trial 
court to offer any elaboration on the meaning of the instructions during 
98. See Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 433 
(1994). . 
99. 12 F.3d at 704. 
100. 12 F.3d at 705-06. 
101. 12 F.3d at 705. 
102. 12 F.3d at 704. 
103. United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 778 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1991), 806 F. 
Supp. 705 (N.D. Ill. 1992), modified, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 433 (1994). 
104. See Free, 12 F.3d at 705-06. 
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the course of the jury's deliberations. But even granting this method-
ological flaw, Judge Posner's arguments concerning the absence of a 
"control" group are ultimately more telling. 
Judge Posner essentially was demanding that the petitioner design 
a new, clearer set of _sentencing instructions implementing Illinois's 
death penalty scheme in order to prevail. The problem, though, as Judge 
Posner acknowledged, is that the Illinois scheme, like most factor stat-
utes, cannot be communicated in terms that ordinary jurors are likely to 
understand. According to Judge Posner, "the cause of the complexity of 
the instructions may be Illinois's constitutionally sanctioned system for 
determining whether to impose the death penalty in a particular case 
rather than the articulation of that system in the challenged instruc-
tions." 105 In short, Judge Posner recognized that virtually any set of in-
structions implementing Illinois's scheme would be difficult for layper-
sons to grasp.106 
If it is true that Illinois's scheme defies comprehensible implemen-
tation, it should be no defense that the scheme has been "constitution-
ally sanctioned" in prior cases - presumably in the 1976 decisions up-
holding similar factor statutes. Of course, Illinois must have regarded 
itself as in a double bind. Forced by Furman to provide guidance to 
death penalty decisionmak:ers, it was now challenged precisely for giv-
ing guidance that was overly intricate and complex. Judge Posner un-
derstandably wants to forestall this catch-22 in which states can be 
faulted either for giving too little guidance or too much. 
Nonetheless, the Court's insistence on greater guidance should not 
be construed as an absolute bar against empirical challenges that reveal 
the limited value of the purported guidance. After all, ignoring the fact 
that the new statutes confuse juries will not promote equality or consis-
tency in sentencing. As Judge Cudahy argued in dissent, "It would be 
ironic but not surprising if the effort to make death sentencing rational 
also contributed mightily to confusing the jury." 107 Rather than pretend-
ing that the confusion did not exist, "we are better off attempting to 
cope with reality than settling for a mere judicial ritual." 108 
More importantly, the reluctance to entertain "comprehensibility" 
challenges to state schemes would be better justified if current death 
penalty doctrine in fact compelled states to enact statutes that cannot be 
105. 12 F.3d at 706. 
106. See 12 F.3d at 706 ("Suppose that it turned out, as we think it well might ••. 
that the failure rate was as high or almost as high when the instructions were reworded 
.... "). 
107. 12 F.3d at 708 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
108. 12 F.3d at 708 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). 
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understood by reasonable jurors. As I have argued above, however, the 
complexity of state schemes, though undoubtedly a byproduct of the 
Court's early decisions, need not be retained to satisfy current constitu-
tional standards.109 States are under no obligation to "channel" sen-
tencer discretion or to structure sentencer decisionmaking in any signifi-
cant way as long as their schemes suitably limit the class of death 
eligible defendants.110 Nor will the Court police outcomes to ensure that 
like cases are treated alike. 111 Accordingly, states can jettison the obfus-
cating dressing in current statutes that was adopted priqiarily to give the 
illusion that the death penalty decision can be meaningfully tamed by 
legal language. 
Whether or not the confusion wrought by current statutes rises to 
the level of a distinct constitutional claim warranting relief, it surely 
should be addressed as a matter of policy. The call for reform is espe-
cially compelling given that the major justification for the complexity 
of contemporary statutes - promoting equality across cases - is not 
significantly advanced under the current regime. 
b. Obscuring the Role of Moral Judgment. One signifipant risk per-
haps more worrisome than the possibility that jurors will not understand 
current death statutes is the possibility that they will. As discussed 
above, 112 the defining feature of most contemporary death penalty 
schemes is that the ultimate decision of life or death turns on an explicit 
or implicit balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors. The hope, 
of course, is that the sentencer, tethered to such factors, will have some 
principled means of approaching the decision and not stray too far from 
morally relevant, permissible considerations. 
Framing the death penalty decision in terms of aggravating and 
mitigating factors alone, however, with no further instruction about the 
larger moral and penological considerations surrounding the decision, 
leads to impoverished decisionmaking. Part of the problem stems from 
the fact that aggravating and mitigating factors are essentially incom-
mensurate.113 It makes no sense to say in the abstract, for example, that 
a certain amount of brutality or harm, on one side of the equation, is 
offset by a defendant's limited intelligence or youthfulness, on the 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42. 
110. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
111. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra section II.A. 
113. See Weisberg, supra note 32, at 394 (arguing that a central difficulty with 
contemporary statutes is that "we cannot devise a mechanical, verifiable process for 
'weighting' the values - that is, assigning them valences in the first place") (quoting 
ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 294 (1981)). 
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other. Indeed, the most aggravated crimes are likely to be the very ones 
in which the defendant has some identifiable limitations which render 
him less culpable. 
For the comparison of aggravating and mitigating factors to be 
meaningful, the decisiol)maker must be informed of the moral question 
or questions that the factors are intended to help answer. In contempo-
rary death penalty law, the overriding but not explicitly disclosed focus 
of state schemes is desert. Virtually all aggravating factors focus on the 
harm caused by the defendant114 while virtually all enumerated mitigat-
ing factors focus on aspects of the offender or offense that reduce the 
defendant's culpability for the crime.115 Instead of asking directly 
whether the defendant deserves to die, though, state schemes give the 
impression that the factors themselves are fully adequate proxies for 
that question. 
As argued above, 116 one central risk of failing to disclose the ulti-
mate moral question is that the sentencer will place undue weight on 
the mere numerical tally of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
without evaluating the moral significance of those factors. It is tempting 
for sentencers to believe that all of the moral work in capital sentencing 
has been performed by the state in crafting an intricate and detailed sen-
tencing scheme. The explicit or implicit direction to weigh aggravating 
and mitigating factors, together with scientific-sounding instructions re-
garding burdens of proof and the manner in which the weighing is to be 
accomplished, suggests strongly that the ultimate death penalty decision 
involves mechanical application of rules rather than the exercise of gen-
uine judgment. Moreover, the drive toward mere numbers has a built-in 
tilt toward death. State statutes generally enumerate more aggravating 
than mitigating factors, and aggravating factors, even objective ones -
such as murders committed in the course of a separate felony 117 - tend 
to have wider applicability than the mitigating circumstances commonly 
enumerated in state schemes - such as duress, 118 extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance, 119 or belief of moral justification.120 
114. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 36, at 854 (discussing the focus of aggra-
vating circumstances in contemporary state statutes). 
I 15. Id. at 848-49 (arguing that '°[a] vast majority of the enumerated mitigating 
circumstances are primarily, often exclusively, relevant to a defendant's culpability"). 
116. See supra text accompanying notes 88-93. 
117. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(l) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); 
WYO. STAT. § 6-2-102(h)(iv), (xii) (Supp. 1995). 
118. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(g) (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. 
§ 99-19-101(6)(e) (1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 971 l(e)(5) (1982). 
119. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-:Sl(2) (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-
304(2) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.070(2) (West Supp. 1996). 
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Mechanical decisionmaking might seem to be desirable. After all, 
one of the central critiques of standardless discretion was that states had 
not sufficiently constrained sentencer decisionmaking to ensure that 
similarly situated offenders receive similar verdicts. The problem, 
though, is that notwithstanding the acknowledged goal of consistent 
sentencing patterns, the Court has concluded that the Eighth Amend-
ment demands a sustained link between community values and resulting 
death verdicts.121 The intimidating, formalistic character of contempo-
rary statutes threatens to sever that connection by obs<;:uring the moral 
role that sentencers are rightly expected to assume. 
Worse still, such statutes invite sentencers to abdicate their inde-
pendent judgment in favor of arbitrarily constructed systems that do not 
embody clear or coherent theories concerning the appropriate scope of 
the death penalty. Aggravating circumstances that purport to identify a 
narrowed category of especially deserving offenders in fact identify vir-
tually the entire class of offenders.122 Moreover, merely to list aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors without specifying in advance the weight to 
be accorded different factors is to leave sentencers in exactly the same 
"unguided" position as the pre-Furman jury, except with a heightened 
and unjustified belief that their decision has been rationalized. As one 
commentator recognized even before the Court had entered the constitu-
tional thicket, "to make explicit the set of factors relevant to sentencing 
is not sufficient to bring the sentences actually meted out under any 
uniform standard at all [and] is wholly insufficient to provide for fair-
ness in jury sentencing, which is precisely what introducing these fac-
tors ... is intended to obtain."123 
At least "true" mandatory death penalty statutes requiring imposi-
tion of the death penalty for certain crimes reflect defensible - al-
though perhaps undesirable - moral theories. Contemporary statutes, 
on the other hand, manage simultaneously to induce a false sense of 
constraint while offering little meaningful guidance. Sentencers are alle-
viated of the responsibility for decisions that in fact reflect no moral 
theory at all. 
120. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(4)0) (Supp. 1995); LA. CODE 
CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.S(d) (West ·1984); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 31-20A-6.F (Michie 
1994). 
121. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 295 (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(stating that " 'one of the most important functions any jury can perform' in exercising 
its discretion to choose 'between life imprisonment and capital punishment' is 'to main-
tain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system' ") (quoting 
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968)). 
122. See supra text accompanying notes 72-80. 
123. Bedau, supra note 1, at 220. 
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The extent to which post-Furman sentencers seek refuge in the in-
tricacies of statutory instructions is reflected in the preliminary findings 
of the Capital Jury Project.124 When asked where the responsibility for 
the death sentence in their case rests, jurors overwhelming indicated 
that the "law" rather. than the "jury" or "individual jurors" bore 
greater responsibility for the verdict. 125 This empirical finding bolsters a 
substantial sociological and legal literature that has predicted just such 
an outcome, based on the observation that individuals seek to avoid per-
sonal moral responsibility for decisions that will lead tQ the infliction of 
pain on others.126 As Professor Weisberg has eloquently argued, "Peo-
ple escape the dilemma [of painful choices] when the law offers them 
the 'choice to be choiceless' through a mechanical formula of decision 
cloaked in the rhetoric of professional authority." 121 
Ill. PROPOSED REFORMS 
If genuine equality in sentencing cannot be achieved through de-
tailed sentencing instructions - and Justice Harlan could find nothing 
but vindication in the post-Furman experiment with guided discretion 
schemes - it seems sensible to dispense with the "comforting illu-
sions" 128 offered by the minutely detailed but ultimately minutely effec-
tive post-Furman sentencing statutes. The suggestions that follow seek 
to restore the moral accountability in capital sentencing that was 
wrongly sacrificed in the name of goals that have not and cannot be 
achieved by increasing the structure of the sentencing decision. The res-
toration, though, does not involve a wholesale return to pre-Furman 
sentencing. Rather, the proposal seeks to ensure that states truly reserve 
124. See Bowers, supra note 28, at 1093-98. 
125. Id. at 1094-95 (indicating that jurors, given the choice of five responsible en-
tities for the verdict, stated as follows: defendant was "most" responsible ( 46.1 % ); law 
was "most" responsible (34.4%); jury was "most" responsible (8.8%); individual juror 
was "most" responsible (6.4%); and judge was "most" responsible (4.5%)). 
126. See Hoffman, supra note 30, at 1157 & n.40 (discussing Robert Cover's illu-
minating account of the manner in which "even experienced judges in capital cases 
must struggle to overcome the natural human reluctance to 'do violence' to another 
human being") (citing Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE LJ. 1601, 
1613-14 (1986)); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 431 (arguing that Cover's claims 
concerning the psychological effects of formal legal constructs on the willingness of 
judges to do violence might well extend to other actors in the legal system, including 
jurors); Weisberg, supra note 32, at 392 (discussing Stanley Milgram's study in which 
Milgram concluded that participants' willingness to inflict apparently severe pain was 
traceable to the "reassuring professional authority of the scientist ... and the generally 
formal atmosphere in which the experiment was conducted") (citing STANLEY Mn.-
GRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 138-43 (1974)). 
127. Weisberg, supra note 32, at 393. 
128. See id. at 395. 
August 1996] Capital Decisionmaking 2621 
the death penalty for a more narrowed class of offenders and that the 
ultimate moral decision concerning the defendant's desert is made in a 
separate proceeding by sentencers fully informed of the scope and sig-
nificance of their decisionmaking power. 
A. Narrowing the Class of the Death Eligible at the Guilt-Innocence 
Trial and Simplifying Punishment-Phase Instruction 
The most damning fact of the decade preceding Furman was the 
enormous disparity between death eligibility and the a:ctual imposition 
of the death penalty. For a variety of reasons, virtually all death penalty 
schemes permitted the death penalty to be assessed for a wide range of 
crimes, yet few offenders were sentenced to death and fewer still actu-
ally were executed during that period. As discussed above, this gulf be-
tween death eligibility and executions fueled claims that the death pen-
alty was administered arbitrarily or, worse, invidiously.129 Contemporary 
statutes have not closed the gap significantly.130 
Unlike the elusive goal of general equality in c;apital sentencing, a 
goal that can be frustrated by numerous uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
variables, including prosecutorial and sentencer discretion, the concern 
that the number of persons eligible for the death penalty reasonably cor-
responds to the number actually sentenced to death is addressable 
through adjustments of state sentencing schemes.131 To bridge the ex-
isting gap, states must refrain from promiscuously enumerating aggra-
vating factors and ensure that the factors - or definitions of capital 
murder - ultimately adopted are both objective and genuinely narrow-
ing. Abandoning variants of the "heinousness" aggravating circum-
stance and the "separate felony" factor will go a long way toward curb-
ing the current overbroad death eligibility in most state schemes. 132 
In addition, states should fulfill the narrowing requirement at the 
guilt-innocence trial through narrowed definitions of capital murder 
rather than at the punishment phase.133 The central drawback to narrow-
ing at the punishment phase is exactly what prompted states to do so -
129. See supra text accompanying notes 13-17. 
130. See Daniel Givelber, The New Law of Murder, 69 IND. L.J. 375, 412-16 
(1994) (comparing the extent of deatli eligibility pre- and post-Furman); Steiker & 
Steiker, supra note 19, at 384 (illustrating the breadth of current death penalty schemes, 
including California's, which lists 19 categories of death-eligible offenses). 
131. The argument for "real narrowing" by state legislatures is defended at 
greater length in Steiker & Steiker, supra note 19, at 415-17. 
132. See Givelber, supra note 130, at 413 (reporting that 238 out of 246 death eli-
gible cases in New Jersey over an eight-year period included one of these two factors). 
133. A number of states, such as Texas and Louisiana, have narrowed their defini-
tions of capital murder at the guilt-innocence phase, but even those narrowed definitions 
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it cultivates the impression that the punishment phase has emerged as a 
well-regulated, formal trial. The increased formality, though, operates 
primarily to obscure the fact that the death penalty decision - and the 
ultimate question of desert - is not amenable to rationalization through 
legal formulae and rules. The enumeration of aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors and the articulation of decision rules concerning the use of 
those factors are grand distractions from the more relevant and under-
standable question of whether the defendant deserves to die. That ques-
tion, and not the amorphous balancing of various statutory factors, pre-
serves the link between the values of the community and the criminal 
process. 
B. Ensuring Consideration of Mitigating Evidence and Facilitating 
the Determination of Desert 
Stripping the punishment phase of its elaborate dressing will also 
reinforce sentencers' responsibility for their verdicts. As in the pre-
Furman era, sentencers will not be able to ignore or escape their role in 
deciding whether death should be imposed. At the same time, sentenc-
ing instructions should communicate in clearer terms what was often 
unsaid or poorly said in the pre-Furman era: that the punishment deci-
sion must take account of aspects of the offense and the offender's 
character and background that bear on his personal culpability for his 
crime.134 
One critical shortcoming of some pre-Furman instructions is that 
the minimal "guidance" they did offer wrongly suggested that with-
holding the death penalty could and should be motivated by a desire to 
bestow "mercy" rather than a principled determination that death is not 
deserved. Contemporary instructions often fare no better in communi-
cating the underlying justification for individualized sentencing. They 
ordinarily list certain "mitigating" factors and permit the sentencer to 
consider "any other" mitigating circumstances.135 They do not, how-
still manage to cover virtually all intentional homicides. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 19.03 (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:30 (West 1986). 
134. The proposed instruction would be as follows: "The death penalty, as op-
posed to other serious punishments sucli as life imprisonment, is reserved only for those 
defendants who deserve the penalty and that the moral judgment of whether death is de-
served remains entirely with you. The determination whether death is deserved involves 
consideration of any factor that suggests whether the defendant is or is not among the 
small group of "worst" offenders; and that, in deciding whether the defendant deserves 
the death penalty, you are required to consider not only the circumstances surrounding 
the crime, but also aspects of the defendant's character, background, and capabilities 
that bear on his culpability for the crime." 
135. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
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ever, articulate a theory of what counts as mitigation, and sentencers 
often are left wondering whether certain purportedly mitigating facts are 
even relevant to their decision. This problem results in part from the 
Court's failure to develop a coherent theory regarding the purpose of in-
dividualized sentencing in the many cases recognizing and applying that 
principle.136 
The individualization requirement is best read to ensure sentencer 
consideration of any evidence relating to the defendant's reduced culpa-
bility for his crime.137 This focus is justified for a vari~ty of historical, 
practical, and normative considerations that I have elaborated else-
where.138 If this culpability focus is accepted, it is imperative that the 
focus be communicated to the sentencer in order to ensure that capital 
verdicts truly represent an assessment that the defendant deserves death. 
Moreover, if desert is recognized to be the foundational inquiry in 
capital sentencing, the sentencer must be apprised of the "real" punish-
ment options apart from death. Hence, in jurisdictions that provide for a 
life sentence without possibility of parole, the sentencer should be in-
formed of the unavailability of parole -· and conversely, should be in-
formed of the extent of parole eligibility in jurisdictions that make that 
option available. Ordinarily, the debate surrounding the decision to in-
form sentencers about parole eligibility focuses on whether either the 
state or the defendant should be permitted to convey accurate informa-
tion that relates to the need for incapacitation. Substantial arguments ex-
ist on both sides of that debate, and the Court recently has recognized a 
defendant's right to inform the sentencer about the "real" meaning of a 
life sentence in cases in_ which the prosecution builds its punishment 
case in part on the defendant's alleged future dangerousness.139 
These debates, however, should be largely moot because accurate 
information regarding punishment alternatives, including parole eligibil-
ity, is essential to the determination of desert. The decision whether to 
impose death is a comparative one, and to make that decision in a prin-
cipled way, sentencers must be aware of the true severity of alternative 
punishments. If the sentencer is left to speculate about the severity of 
nondeath options there is a substantial chance that death will be im-
posed notwithstanding the sentencer's belief that the undisclosed pun-
ishment would represent a sufficiently harsh alternative to execution. 
136. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 36, at 844-45. 
137. See id. at 846. 
138. See id. 
139. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2193-94 (1994). 
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CONCLUSION 
Over two decades ago, the Court concluded that standardless dis-
cretion in capital decisionmaking was inconsistent with the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. Since that 
time, states have crafted a variety of intricate statutes purporting to en-
hance the reliability and consistency of capital verdicts. For reasons that 
were well anticipated by the opponents of Court-mandated reform, these 
new statutes have done little to secure equality in capital sentencing. 
Despite the aura of science that surrounds the new provisions, capital 
sentencers remain essentially unrestrained in their choice to impose or 
withhold the death penalty for virtually any offender who commits 
murder. 
Perhaps less anticipated than the difficulties of rationalizing the 
death penalty decision were the costs of attempting to do so. Instead of 
clarifying and distilling the relevant issues in capital cases, the jargon 
and complexity that pervade contemporary punishment-phase instruc-
tions obscure the fundamental moral role that capital sentencers should 
be expected to assume. By distracting sentencers from the unavoidable 
and irreducible question of desert, the contemporary effort to tame the 
death penalty decision has proven not merely unachievable but counter-
productive as well. 
Notwithstanding the Court's oft-repeated condemnation of standar-
dless discretion in its post-Furman decisions, current doctrine requires 
extraordinarily modest structuring of the death penalty decision. States 
can, for example, fully satisfy the "guidance" requirement by narrow-
ing their definitions of capital murder at the guilt-innocence phase and 
posing one question at the punishment phase: should the defendant live 
or die. Given this somewhat surprising evolution - or devolution - of 
the doctrine, the complexity of contemporary statutes, though no doubt 
attributable to Court decisions, remains in place largely as a matter of 
state choice rather than federal compulsion. 
The ultimate question, then, is not whether revamping sentencing 
instructions in the manner I propose is constitutionally permissible, but 
rather whether such revision is normatively desirable. I argue that it is, 
partly because so little is achieved in terms of actual guidance under 
current statutory schemes, and partly because the appearance of gui-
dance undermines important goals in capital sentencing that should not 
be sacrificed for the sake of appearances. 
